















China’s Sovereign Wealth Fund:   
Weakness and Challenges 
 
Abstract: The establishment of sovereign wealth funds in large developing countries has 
generated hot debate among participants in the international financial market. When 
accumulated foreign exchange reserves surpass a sufficient and an appropriate level, the 
costs, risks and impacts on the macro-economy of countries holding reserves need to be 
considered. The Chinese Government established China Investment Corporation (CIC) in 
2007 to diversify its investment of foreign reserves and to raise investment income. However, 
because of certain conflicts of interest and institution-design caveats, CIC possesses some 
internal weakness, including a vague orientation, mixed investment strategies and 
inefficient bureaucratic style. Although the subprime crisis has softened certain regulations 
and lessened rejection by the USA of CIC potential investments, the increased volatility and 
uncertainty of the market means that CIC is facing some new challenges in terms of its 
investment decisions. Moreover, CIC is competing with other Chinese investment 
institutions for injections of funds from the Chinese Government. 
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China established its own sovereign wealth fund (SWF), the China Investment Corporation 
(CIC), on 29 September 2007. With an initial capital fund of US$200bn, CIC fast became 
one of the most prominent SWF in the world. Since its initiation, CIC has aroused 
suspicion and apprehension. What is its motivation and likely behavior? Is it an aggressive 
white shark or an amiable blue whale? 
Sovereign wealth funds are state-owned investment funds set up to invest excess 
foreign exchange reserves or natural resource export surplus. SWFs are part of the large 
collection of sovereign investment tools, including state-owned pension funds. Before the 
establishment of CIC, the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE), under the 
People’s Bank of China (PBOC), was the only management authority of Chinese foreign 
exchange reserves. The establishment of CIC has provided another avenue through which 
China can invest its growing foreign exchange reserves both at home and abroad. 
The annual accumulation of Chinese foreign exchange reserves has been accelerating 
since 2001 (see Figure 1). From 2001 to 2007, the scale of foreign exchange reserves 
increased 6.2 times. Although an adequate level of foreign exchange reserves is necessary 
for international trade and finance, such large amounts of reserves also poses great 
challenges for China.   
 






















































































First, the opportunity cost of holding foreign exchange reserves is mounting up. China 
invests the lion’s share of its foreign exchange reserves in US treasury and agency bonds, 
which are highly liquid and safe but provide relatively low returns. For example, from 2001 
to 2007, the interest rate of US 10-year treasury bonds fluctuated around 3–6 percent 
(Federal Reserve of the US, 2008). However, China also receives a large amount of foreign 
direct investment (FDI) inflows every year. According to a World Bank investigation on 12 
400 foreign enterprises in 120 cities of China, the average annual return on investment 
reached 22 percent in 2005 (Xinhua Agency, 2006). The gap between the high yield of FDI 
in China and the low yield of Chinese foreign exchange investment could be regarded as 
the opportunity cost of holding foreign exchange reserves.   
Second, the exchange rate risk might cause a tremendous potential loss of the 
international purchasing power of China’s foreign exchange reserves. By the end of March 
2008, Chinese foreign exchange reserves had reached US$1.68tn (SAFE, 2008). If the 
nominal exchange rate of US$ to RMB were to depreciate by 10 percent, the domestic 
value of Chinese foreign exchange reserves would suffer a loss of US$168bn, which is 
equivalent to 5 percent of the 2007 Chinese GDP. Since the reform of the RMB exchange 
rate regime in July 2005, the RMB has been gradually appreciating against the US dollar. 
With the subprime crisis, the US dollar might continue to fall, and, therefore, cause further 
wealth losses for China. 
     Third, the massive accumulation of foreign exchange reserves has resulted in excess 
liquidity in China’s financial market. To offset the inflationary impact of dollar purchase, 
the Peoples’ Bank of China (PBOC), China’s central bank, has had to issue central bank 
bills for sterilization. However, this practice is not sustainable. The interest rate that the 
PBOC has to pay for the central bank bills has been increasing, indicating that the PBOC 
has to run a loss. 
How can the Chinese Government cope with these challenges? One approach is to 
limit further accumulation of foreign exchange reserves, which requires an exchange rate 
policy that allows the RMB more flexibility and further appreciation. This would be 
contingent on the support of structural reform encouraging domestic demand and changing 
the pro-export and pro-FDI policies. The second approach is to manage the foreign 
exchange reserves in a more active way and pursue higher returns. Currently, most excess 
funds are used to purchase US Treasury bills. However, China’s foreign exchange reserve 







estate and other financial products. The successful example of other SWFs, such as the 
Government Investment Corporation (GIC) and Temasek in Singapore encouraged China to 
establish its own SWF in 2007. CIC is responsible for actively managing Chinese foreign 
exchange reserves, and tends to undertake more aggressive investment than SAFE, to 
maximize returns with controllable risk. SAFE continues to play its role by undertaking 
traditional low-risk and high-liquidity investment, especially through the purchase of 
government bonds. 
The rest part of the paper is organized as follows. Section II depicts the structure and 
operation of the CIC. Sections III and IV analyze the internal weakness and external 
challenges of the CIC, respectively. Section V concludes the paper. 
II. Structure and Operation of China Investment Corporation 
China Investment Cooperation is a semi-independent, quasigovernmental investment firm 
established by the Chinese Government to invest a portion of the nation’s foreign exchange 
reserves. CIC is a ministry-level state-owned enterprise (SOE), and it is under the direct 
management of the State Council, which means that CIC is parallel with the PBOC, the 
Ministry of Finance (MOF) and the State-owned Asset Supervision and Administration 
Commission (SASAC). This is a unique circumstance: CIC is the only ministry-level SOE. 
SAFE is a vice ministry-level authority that belongs to the PBOC. All the national large 
SOEs are under the management of the SASAC. The chairman of the board of CIC, Lou 
Jiwei, is the former deputy secretary-general of the State Council. The board of directors is 
composed of ministry or vice ministry-level officials from the State Council, the National 
Council for Social Security Fund (NCSSF), the MOF, the National Development and 
Reform Commission (NDRC), the Ministry of Commerce, the PBOC and SAFE. The 
arrangement of high level personnel in CIC reflects that, on the one hand, the Chinese 
Government is paying considerable attention to the active management of foreign exchange 
reserves; on the other hand, the establishment and operation of CIC is in fact a result of 
compromise and cooperation among various government institutions.   
Figure 2 shows the governance structure of CIC. The board of directors operates on 
behalf of the only share holder, the State Council, which is responsible for making crucial 
decisions. The management committee is in charge of the operational activities of CIC, 
which is under the control of the board of directors. There is also a supervisory board, 
which supervises the function of not only the board of directors but also the management 







Party of China (CPC) committee play in CIC, which makes the corporate governance of 
CIC more sophisticated. 
 
Figure 2. The Governance Structure of China Investment Cooperation 
 
Note: CPC, Communist Party of China. 
 
From August to December 2007, the MOF issued eight terms of special government 
bonds, accounting for RMB1.55bn. Then the MOF undertook asset swap deal with the 
PBOC to exchange the RMB1.55bn funds for approximately US$200bn in foreign 
exchange reserve assets. Finally, the MOF injected the US$200bn foreign exchange reserve 
assets into CIC, which constitute the initial pool of money that CIC could manage. 
Li Yong, the Vice Minister of the MOF and a non-executive director of the CIC, 
outlined the future allocation of US$200bn: one-third would be used to purchase the 
Central Huijin Investment Company (Central Huijin) from the PBOC, another one-third 
would be used to inject capital into China Development Bank (CDB) and the Agricultural 
Bank of China (ABC), and the rest would be invested in overseas capital markets (Xinhua 
Agency, 2007). However, according to Gao Xiqing, the General Manager of CIC, the 
money used for overseas investment would rise from US$66bn to US$90bn, an increase of 
more than 30 percent. CIC changed its allocation because the Chinese Government reduced 
the amount needed to restructure some state-owned financial institutions, in particular, ABC 
(Xie, 2008). 
At the end of 2007, it took CIC US$67bn to purchase Central Huijin from the PBOC, 
which became a 100-percent subsidiary company owned by CIC. Central Huijin was 
established in December 2003. Its role is to inject capital into state-owned commercial 
banks and securities companies to facilitate the process of business restructuring and 
overseas listing. Table 1 summarizes the investment portfolio of Central Huijin since its 
State Council 
CPC Committee  Board of Directors  Supervisory Board 







establishment. After the successful listing of the Bank of China, China Construction Bank 
and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China on H-share and A-share markets, Central 
Huijin has earned huge profits, amounting to US$161.7bn by 28 October 2008 (Li H., 
2008).  
 
Table 1. The Investment Portfolio of Central Huijin 
Time Company  Amount  (US$bn) 
December 2003  Bank of China  22.50 
December 2003  China Construction Bank  20 
December 2003  China Jian Yin Investment    2.50 
June 2004  Bank of Communications  0.36
a 
April 2005  Industrial and Commercial Bank of China  15 
June 2005  China Galaxy Securities Company  1.21
a 




August 2005  Guotai Junan Securities  0.12
a 
August 2005  China Galaxy Financial Holding Company  0.68
a 
September 2005  China Everbright Bank  2.47
a 
December 2006  China Development Bank  20 
Source: Wikipedia (2008a). 
Note: 
aThis represents an RMB injection, which is calculated in terms of the US dollar by 
using the exchange rate at the end of the month of capital injection. 
 
There are two channels for CIC to pursue to undertake overseas investment. The first 
channel is to employ external fund managers to manage the overseas portfolio on behalf of 
CIC. CIC employs both fixed income investment managers and equity investment 
managers. The second channel is to conduct overseas investment directly, or to invest in 
certain offshore investment funds. From May 2007 to September 2008, CIC conducted four 
investments directly, and one investment through overseas private equity funds (see Table 
2). Because of the current investment uncertainty brought about by the subprime mortgage 
crisis, the market value of CIC’s investment in Blackstone and Morgan Stanley has fallen 
dramatically, which has aroused strong doubt and criticism among the Chinese public. As a 












Table 2. China Investment Cooperation’s Overseas Investment 
Company Time  Amount  (US$bn)  Type 
The Blackstone Group  May 2007  3.0  Pre-IPO,  shares,  9.4% 
stake 
China Railway Group  November 
2007 
0.1 Pre-IPO,  shares 
Morgan Stanley  December 
2007 
5.0 Convertible  bond, 
9.9% stake, 9% annual 
return before 
conversion 
VISA  March 2008 0.1  Pre-IPO, shares 
JC Flowers PE Fund  April 2008  3.2  US  PE  fund,  80% 
ownership 
Source: SWF Institute (2008a). 
Note: IPO, initial public offering. 
III. Internal Weakness of China Investment Cooperation 
As a SWF owned by the largest developing country, CIC has received continuous attention 
from all over the world. Governments of developed countries, especially those of the USA 
and European countries, have suspected that the investment decisions of CIC might be 
dominated by Chinese national interest, and that CIC might try to control their domestic 
strategic industries. Global investors fear that the participation of CIC in overseas financial 
markets will amplify market volatility, not only because CIC is an immature institutional 
investor and provides poor disclosure of its spending, but also because CIC has a 
tremendous pool of money. Moreover, the Chinese public doubts CIC’s ability to make 
money in overseas markets. The market value loss of CIC’s investment in Blackstone 
aggravated this doubt. Indeed, the doubts and fears from outside and inside China are 
reasonable to some extent, because CIC has several internal weaknesses, evident since its 
establishment. 
 
1. Vague Orientation 
There is a “capital myth” regarding the CIC. Is the US$200bn the capital of CIC? Most 
people would say yes, but this might not be the truth. The reason for this is that CIC must 
pay interest on its US$200bn assets to the MOF. As mentioned previously, US$200bn in 
foreign exchange reserves was purchased from the PBOC by the MOF, and the RMB1.55tn 
paid by the MOF was collected by issuing special government bonds. However, the MOF is 
not the shareholder of CIC, and the MOF requires CIC to pay the interest for the special 







profit of RMB300m every day to meet the interest of the bonds and operational costs. CIC 
should make its first interest payment for the bonds in February 2008, which amounted to 
RMB12.9bn (Li L., 2008). If the CIC should pay interest for the special government bonds, 
it is obvious that the US$200bn is not the capital, but the debt of CIC. Therefore, the MOF 
is the creditor rather than the shareholder of the CIC.   
The capital myth of the CIC reflects its vague orientation. There are two types of 
orientation for SWFs in the world. The first type is as a fund manager, such as the 
Government of Singapore Investment Corporation (GIC). GIC does not own the funds it 
manages, but manages them on behalf of its clients, the Government of Singapore and the 
Monetary Authority of Singapore. The Singapore MOF represents the government in 
dealing with GIC (GIC, 2008). The second type is an investment fund, such as the 
Stabilization Fund of the Russian Federation (SFRF). SFRF accumulates revenue from 
export duties and tax on oil mining when the price for Urals oil exceeds the set cut-off price. 
The capital of the fund may be used to cover the federal budget deficit and for other 
purposes, if its balance exceeds 500bn rubles (Wikipedia, 2008b).    As a fund manager, the 
fund is neither the capital nor the debt of SWF, and SWF is a pure fund manager. As an 
investment fund, the fund is the capital of SWF. For both types of fund, SWF does not have 
debt, and need not pay any interest. 
China Investment Cooperation’s orientation is very awkward, because it is neither a 
fund manager like GIC, nor a real fund like SFRF. We do not know how much capital CIC 
owns. We do not know who the real shareholder is of the CIC. What we do know for sure is 
that CIC has a huge debt amounting to US$200bn. CIC has been facing great pressure to 
pay the principal and interest since it was established. The unique orientation of the CIC 
might be its “original sin”. 
China Investment Cooperation’s vague orientation leaves it with the following 
disadvantages. First, CIC has to pay interest for special government bonds. To make a profit 
after disbursing interest, CIC will be forced to engage in more risky high-income 
investments. In other words, the heavy debt burden limits CIC’s free portfolio allocation for 
longer-term diversified assets. Second, as we will discuss in the next subsection, to mitigate 
the pressure of paying interest on special government bonds, CIC merged Central Huijin, 
and the latter became a whole-owned subsidiary of the CIC. As a result, the role of CIC as a 
typical financial investor has been ruined. Naturally, CIC is facing more criticism and 
regulations, and is even being rejected by some developed countries because it is classified 







The vague orientation of the CIC might be a compromise reached by the PBOC and 
the MOF in the competition for foreign exchange management. In most developed 
countries, the MOF is the owner of foreign exchange reserves, and manages them directly, 
or empowers other institutions to manage reserves, such as the central bank. However, the 
PBOC owns and manages these foreign exchange reserves in China. In order to actively 
manage foreign exchange reserves, the PBOC could establish a new subsidiary institution 
to undertake diversified investment, and leave SAFE to take care of traditional investment. 
However, the MOF injected money into the CIC by issuing special government bonds, 
which revealed the MOF’s desire to participate in the management of foreign exchange 
reserves. The MOF has not become a shareholder of CIC because the central government 
has tried to create a balance in the competition between the PBOC and the MOF.   
 
2. Mixed Investment Strategies 
There are mainly two kinds of institutional investors: financial investors and strategic 
investors. Financial investors tend to maximize investment income and have little interest 
in controlling the objective company. Strategic investors tend to play a more influential role 
in the management of the objective company. For example, strategic investors often require 
seats in the board of directors of the objective company. 
Because SWF have a strong government background, most of SWFs choose to behave 
as a financial investor to mitigate the potential doubt and rejection of the countries that 
receive their investments. A typical example is the Global Government Pension Fund of 
Norway. This fund owns shares in approximately 3500 companies, and it usually holds 
small stakes, typically below 1 percent (Lyons, 2007). In contrast, a generally recognized 
strategic investor among global SWFs is Temasek. In Singapore, Temasek is a holding 
company of dozens of enterprises in the industries such as financial service, 
telecommunications and media, transportation and logistics, real estate etc. Temasek is also 
an active investor in the overseas market, and its overseas portfolio includes the Bank of 
China, China Construction Bank, Hana Financial Group (South Korea), ICICI Bank (India) 
and Shin Corporation (Thailand). (Temasek Holdings, 2008). In September 2007, Temasek 
purchased 17.22 percent of the shares in Standard Chartered Bank (Lyons, 2007).   
Although CIC is trying to be depicted as a pure financial investor, it is regarded as a 
strategic investor to a large extent. One of the most important reasons for this is that Central 
Huijin, CIC’s subsidiary company, is a typical domestic strategic investor. The role of 







institutions, and its capital came from the PBOC before it was merged by the CIC. Central 
Huijin was able to buy the shares of state-owned commercial banks at very low prices, 
which meant that, after the successful listing of these banks, Central Huijin is able to make 
huge profits. However, Central Huijin’s profits come from its monopolistic position and 
political background, not from its competitiveness.   
China Investment Cooperation purchased Central Huijin so that it could use the profit 
of Central Huijin to pay the interest of special government bonds. For example, on 25 
March 2008, Central Huijin transferred its 3 billion shares in the Bank of Communications 
to the MOF without payment. This can be interpreted by the market as CIC paying the 
interest of bonds by asking Central Huijin to transfer some holding shares to the MOF 
(Zhang, 2008a). Purchasing Central Huijin alleviated CIC’s pressure to pay interest, but it 
put CIC into hot water. Because of the strategic nature of Central Huijin, CIC is deemed to 
be a strategic investor. Although CIC did not require any seat in    the board of directors in 
making the deal with Blackstone or Morgan Stanley, it is still widely believed to execute 
mixed investment strategies.   
 
3. Bureaucratic Management 
As mentioned above, the CIC management team is composed of government officials, most 
of them lacking professional skills and market experience. For these officials, being an 
executive of CIC is only a temporary job. They will return to positions in government in the 
future. Because of pressure from other bureaucratic institutions, compensation received by 
the CIC management team does not reach the level received by other executives in the 
industry. If the compensation received by members of the management team is rather low, it 
is difficult for CIC to offer competitive compensation to global first-class fund managers. 
According to Li et al. (2008), the annual package for the market traders in CIC is 
approximately US$100 000, which is much lower than the industry level.
 There might be 
some patriotic and excellent Chinese fund managers who are glad to work for CIC for 
relatively low compensation. However, if they do not receive full trust and empowerment, 
they might choose to leave after a short time. 
To regulate the overseas investment of SWFs established by developing countries, US 
Treasury is working with the IMF and the OECD to formulate a best practice model for 
SWFs, the objective of which is to make SWFs more transparent, predictable, and 
accountable to their own citizens and government andcitizens and governments in host 







Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA) from the United Arab Emirates and GIC from 
Singapore on the principles for SWF investment (US Treasury, 2008). We believe that this 
agreement would be a good reference for working out a best practice model for SWFs. 
However, CIC has not been actively involved in the formulation of an international 
best practice model. According to Gao Xiqing, the General Manager of the CIC, the 
formulation of best practice for SWF is unnecessary, because it is irrational, and might 
upset the Chinese people (Feng and Qiu, 2008). Obviously, CIC lacks a pragmatic attitude 
toward SWF best practice. In the process of international negotiation and bargaining, what 
CIC really needs is a pragmatic philosophy, not bureaucratic management. CIC should 
actively participate in the formulation of a best practice model for global SWFs and try to 
maximize its own interest. 
IV. Major Challenges for China Investment Cooperation 
1. Volatility and Uncertainty in the Global Market 
 
The subprime mortgage crisis broke out in the summer of 2007, just before the 
establishment of CIC. The crisis amplified the volatility of global financial markets and 
brought more uncertainty to the world economy. With the surge in default rates of subprime 
mortgage loans, some financial institutions that have bought securitization products based 
on subprime mortgages, such as Mortgage-Backed Securities  and Collateralized Debt 
Obligations, have been suffering huge losses. As for those financial institutions relying on 
leverage and value at risk (VAR) management, they begin the deleveraging process upon 
suffering a loss, which means that they are forced to sell off other financial assets in their 
balance sheet to achieve liquidity. If all financial institutions start selling off assets 
simultaneously, the capital market will fall in value. Furthermore, it will cause a liquidity 
squeeze and a credit crunch. During such a bear market, the current portfolios of SWFs 
would also endure significant falls in market value. For example, after CIC invested in 
Blackstone, the market value of the company dropped over 50 percent. CIC has become a 
serious victim of the subprime mortgage crisis   
    However, the crisis has also created some new opportunities for SWFs to invest in 
Wall Street financial institutions that have suffered great loss during the crisis. The 
deleveraging institutions have sought new shareholders to inject additional capital, which 
can help to enhance capital adequacy ratios. Table 3 summarizes the SWFs cash injections 







SWFs reached approximately US$44.9bn. Unfortunately, even after receiving capital 
injections from SWFs, Citigroup, Merrill Lynch and UBS still disclosed more potential loss. 
If the SWFs have invested in those institutions half a year later, the former    might have got 
a much lower price. 
 
Table 3. Injections of Sovereign Wealth Funds into US Banks, 
March 2007–April 2008 






Citigroup  Abu Dhabi Investment 




Citigroup  Government of Singapore 





























PLC  Temasek Holdings  1.8  2005  Common stock
Credit 
Suisse  Qatar Investment Authority  1.0  603  Common stock
UBS  Government of Singapore 




UBS  Saudi Arabian Monetary 




Source: SWF Institute (2008b).   
As a newcomer, it is more difficult for CIC to determine appropriate objective 









2. More Strict Control by the Host Country 
 
The developed countries fear that SWF in large developing countries (such as China and 
Russia) might purchase their sensitive enterprises and take control of energy, biotechnology, 
finance, aviation and other strategic industries. Therefore, the USA and European countries 
are trying to apply strictly control to the investment of SWFs from the developing world. 
The specific measures include the following. First, SWFs in developing countries are 
required to increase their levels of transparency. For example, they should disclose annual 
financial statements audited by independent accounting firms to facilitate host countries’ 
understanding of the investment strategies, the corporate governance and the risk 
management of developing countries’ SWF. Second, for any company in a developed 
country, there is an upper limit of shares to be purchased by developing country SWFs, of 
only 20 percent. Third, the developing country that owns the SWF should reach a reciprocal 
agreement with the host country. If the developing country requires the developed economy 
to open its financial market and to give SWF national treatment, the developing country 
should also do the same. Fourth, the source of the SWF fund should be checked. If the fund 
comes from the accumulation of reserves by manipulating the exchange rate (such as 
China), or comes from the national resources by manipulating the price of resources (such 
as OPEC and Russia), those countries must take the initiative to get rid of the above 
manipulations (Garten, 2007). 
        As mentioned before, the US Treasury, the IMF and the OECD are working together to 
formulate a best practice model for global SWFs. Edwin Truman developed a scoreboard to 
evaluate the structure, governance, accountability, transparency and behavior of SWFs. In 
the 34 non-pension SWFs, CIC ranks 21st (Truman, 2008). Table 4 shows the comparison 
of specific scores of selected SWFs. The rank of CIC is lower than the SWFs from 
developed countries, East Asian countries and Russia, but higher than the SWFs from some 
OPEC countries such as Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. As for the specific items, CIC 












Table 4. Score Board of Non-pension Sovereign Wealth Funds 






(Alaska)  Alaska Permanent Fund  100  80  100  83  94 
Norway  Government Pension Fund 
Global  94 100  100  67  92 
Korea  Korea Investment 
Corporation  75 60  45  25  51 
Russia  Reserve Fund and 
National Welfare Fund  72 40  50  33  51 
Singapore Temasek  Holding  50  50  61  0  45 
Singapore  Government of Singapore 
Investment Corporation  63 40  39  17  41 
China  China Investment 
Corporation  50 50  14  17  29 
Qatar  Qatar Investment 




Abu Dhabi Investment 
Authority and Council  25 0  4  8  9 
Source: Truman (2008). 
The SWF Institute located in California of the USA has developed a 
Linaburg–Maduell transparency index to evaluate the transparency of global SWFs. Figure 
3 demonstrates the ranks of some major SWFs. Among the global top SWFs, the 
transparency score of CIC is the lowest. Therefore, there is still a long way to go for CIC to 
catch up with the average level. 
Figure 3. The Rank of Linaburg–Maduell Transparency Index 
   
Source: SWF Institute (2008c). Note: GIC, Government Investment Corporation; ADIA, 








The poor score reflects CIC’s weakness in transparency, behavior, governance and 
structure. Therefore, CIC tends to be a target of criticism and is subject to restrictions from 
developed host countries. 
 
3. Domestic Competition Pressure 
 
China Investment Cooperation is not the only Chinese sovereign entity that diversifies its 
investment portfolio in the global financial market. After the establishment of CIC, SAFE 
also accelerated its investment in equity in foreign companies. In December 2007, a Hong 
Kong-based subsidiary of SAFE bought minority stakes of less than 1 percent in three 
Australian commercial banks: ANZ Bank, the Commonwealth Bank of Australia and the 
National Australia Bank. The total amount value of these investments was US$176m 
(Johnston, 2008). In April 2008, SAFE purchased a 1.6-percent stake in Total SA, Europe’s 
third largest oil company, at a cost of US$2.8bn (Wang, 2008). In the same month, SAFE 
acquired a stake of nearly 1 percent in BP, Britain’s largest company, for approximately 
£1bn (Chen, 2008). The unusual investment activities undertaken by SAFE demonstrate 
that SAFE is trying to prove that it can also participate in more risky investment using 
foreign exchange reserves. Given that SAFE employs many experienced professionals who 
have been managing reserve assets for a long time, SAFE will become a powerful 
competitor of CIC if SAFE continues to diversify its overseas portfolio aggressively. 
    Besides SAFE, CIC is also facing competition from other state-owned institutions, 
such as CDB, the NCSSF and even some state-owned monopoly companies, such as 
PetroChina and Sinopec. CDB purchased a 3.1-percent stake in Barclay, for £1.45bn 
pounds in July 2007, and it further injected £136m pounds into Barclay in June 2008 
(Zhang, 2008b). Since its establishment in 2000, the NCSSF has been actively managing its 
portfolio in both domestic and overseas markets. It employs overseas fund managers to 
undertake its overseas investment. The market value of the assets managed by the NCSSF 
had reached RMB516bn by the end of 2007 (SSF, 2007). In addition, if CIC expands its 
overseas investment to the global oil companies, it will face competition from the Chinese 
oil giants, such as PetroChina and Sinopec. 
    In the arena of overseas investment of sovereign institutions, CIC is facing intensive 
competition from the NCSSF, SAFE, CDB and state-owned monopoly companies. The 







new funds into CIC in the future. Therefore, if the performance of CIC drops behind that of 
SAFE or the NCSSF, the management of CIC will undoubtedly encounter great pressure. 
V. Conclusions 
In the face of global imbalances, China has accumulated large amounts of foreign exchange 
reserves. When the scale of foreign reserves surpassed a sufficient and appropriate level, 
the costs, risks and impacts to the macro-economy of holding too much in foreign exchange 
reserves became a hot issue. The CIC was established to diversify the investment of 
China’s foreign exchange reserves and to raise returns on investment. 
As a result of the competition between the PBOC and the MOF to obtain control of 
foreign exchange reserves, CIC become a sole state-owned enterprise controlled directly by 
the State Council. The most important internal weakness of the CIC lies in its orientation. 
CIC has to pay interest on the US$200bn injected capital, which indicates that this 
US$200bn is a CIC’s liability. To help CIC to repay the interest on special government 
bonds, the Chinese Government asked CIC to make Central Huijin a subsidiary. Although 
Central Huijin boosts CIC’s financial status, it impairs CIC’s image as a financial investor 
because Central Huijin is a typical strategic investor, it is difficult for CIC to become a 
purely financial investor. Therefore, CIC is facing more strict regulations and even rejection 
from certain host countries. 
Since the emergence of the subprime crisis, deleveraging US financial institutions 
have suffered great losses and have been thirsty for capital injection. Therefore, the US 
Government has become more open to investments by SWFs from emerging markets and 
developing countries, including CIC. However, in a volatile international financial market 
full of uncertainty, CIC should be very cautious in making new investments. 
China Investment Cooperation is not the only Chinese sovereign institution with an 
overseas portfolio. CIC is competing with the NCSSF, SAFE, and other financial 
institutions for more injections of funding from Chinese Government. Whether the Chinese 
Government injects more funds into CIC will depend on CIC’s performance and the 
performance of other Chinese sovereign investment institutions.   
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